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Ayer: From the Editors

FROM THE EDITORS
The geostrategic picture in the Middle East has been transformed fundamentally
over the last several years by the rapprochement between Israel and the Arab
world, midwifed by the Trump administration in a series of unexpected diplomatic coups. The ramifications of these developments have only begun to play
themselves out and to be assessed adequately by observers. Surprisingly little
attention seems to have been paid to their impact on the Israeli military. In “The
Transformation of the Israel Defense Forces,” Avi Jager provides a concise but
comprehensive account of the significant changes that have occurred throughout
the IDF in recent years, one informed by authoritative, high-level sources within
Israel. These changes include major reductions in the conventional arms, particularly infantry and armor, and increased emphasis on unconventional forces
and cyber; they reflect a conviction that in the future the threat the nation likely
will face no longer will come from states but rather from irregular organizations such as Hamas. And, perhaps most importantly, they signal a shift from
the long-standing Israeli preference for offense and preemption toward a more
defensive orientation. Jager makes clear, however, that there are voices in Israel
that question the wisdom of such a shift. Avi Jager is a reserve officer in the IDF
special forces.
The eastern Mediterranean as an arena of sea-power competition has been
lost from view since the end of the Cold War and the withdrawal of the U.S.
Sixth Fleet in its aftermath. Times are changing. It recently was announced that,
for the first time in forty years, an American naval vessel will be based at Souda
Bay in Crete. Greece and Turkey are at odds over territorial maritime claims,
and the discovery of enormous natural gas deposits in the waters off Cyprus in
recent years has opened up a complex face-off among Turkey, Greece, Cyprus,
and Israel. In this context, the question of Israel’s relation to the sea takes on
major strategic significance. In “Cultural Challenges for Israeli Sea Power in
the Eastern Mediterranean,” Samuel Helfont provides a fascinating overview
of the State of Israel’s cultural attitudes toward the sea, as limited by its deeply
felt connection with the “Land of Israel.” He argues that Israel has yet to make
the fundamental cultural turn toward its clearly ordained strategic maritime
future. Samuel Helfont is a Naval War College professor teaching at the Naval
Postgraduate School in Monterey, California.
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The centrality of culture in developing a state’s maritime orientation is also
the theme of Andrew Rhodes’s “The 1988 Blues: Admirals, Activists, and the
Development of the Chinese Maritime Identity.” Rhodes points to 1988 as a decisive year in the turn to the sea of the People’s Republic of China, witnessing as it
did two unrelated but important developments: the airing on Chinese television
of the six-part documentary River Elegy, which became wildly popular, and the
beginning of the PRC’s commercial and military expansion into the South China
Sea. Strikingly, the young filmmakers who produced the series were prodemocracy activists who fled the country after the Tiananmen massacre of the following
year, while not all members of the Chinese leadership at the time were happy with
the criticisms the documentary had expressed over the country’s past neglect of
its maritime frontier. Andrew Rhodes is a professor in the China Maritime Studies Institute at the Naval War College.
To grasp the full magnitude of the maritime challenge posed by the People’s
Republic of China to the United States and its allies, it is essential to look beyond
the purely naval dimension. In “The Middle Kingdom Returns to the Sea, While
America Turns Its Back: How China Came to Dominate the Global Maritime
Industry, and the Implications for the World,” Christopher J. McMahon issues a
stark warning about the consequences of the U.S. government’s continuing virtual abandonment of the commercial maritime industry. The Chinese have made
no secret of their ambition to dominate this industry with regard to commercial
shipbuilding as well as infrastructure construction around the world (the socalled Belt and Road Initiative), and they are well on their way to doing so—the
number of large private corporations in this business continues to shrink at an
alarming rate. The consequences are not merely economic but also political and
strategic. Christopher J. McMahon holds the Maritime Administration Emory S.
Land Chair of Merchant Marine Affairs at the Naval War College.
How military organizations adapt to the (real or supposed) lessons of battle
remains a matter of great interest to military historians and practitioners alike.
Ethan Rafuse, in “One Approach, Two Results: The French Army, the U.S. Marines, and the Frontal Assault during the World Wars,” lays out what at first seems
an improbable comparison between French battle tactics in the two world wars
and the Marine Corps’s approach to amphibious warfare during the Pacific War.
In neither case, he argues, was maneuver warfare an option; the challenge was
rather that of finding the proper balance of artillery and infantry assets employed
in frontal assaults. While not denying that French performance suffered in both
wars from doctrinal rigidity, he suggests that the conventional wisdom fails to
account for France’s eventual success in World War I. As for the Marines, he argues that their well-deserved reputation for doctrinal innovation enabled them
to learn from initial mistakes in ways not altogether dissimilar to what the French
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army did in that conflict. Ethan Rafuse is a professor of military history at the U.S.
Army Command and General Staff College.
Finally, in “London and Washington: Maintaining Naval Cooperation despite
Strategic Differences during Operation EARNEST WILL,” Richard A. Mobley offers a fine-grained case study of coalition operations—specifically, the uniquely
intimate U.S.-U.K. alliance relationship in the Persian Gulf during the reflagging
and protection of Kuwaiti oil tankers in 1987, toward the end of the Iran-Iraq
War. This analysis, based primarily on recently declassified material from British
archives, shows the extent to which differing perceptions and interests can complicate alliance relationships and should require a more sophisticated approach
to such relationships than has been the norm, at least on the U.S. side. Richard
A. Mobley is a former intelligence officer in the U.S. Navy.
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